

Chapter 1

The Impossibility of Education

Abstract This chapter explores education as one nexus of Foucault's three vectors of analysis or 'aspects of experience'—truth, power, and subjectivity. It further considers how the changing emphases between these vectors in Foucault's oeuvre can enable us to think about education differently. I put these vectors to work in relation to a exploratory and very provisional genealogy of pedagogy and the school. Finally, the chapter discusses what such analyses mean in terms of education as a philosophical practice, and suggests, as far as the early and mid period work of Foucault is concerned, in relation to his strident anti-humanism, that education is impossible.

Keywords Truth • Subjectivity • Power • Pedagogy • Anti-humanism

Education may well be, as of right, the instrument whereby every individual, in a society like our own, can gain access to any kind of discourse. But we well know that in its distribution, in what it permits and in what it prevents, it follows the well-trodden battle-lines of social conflict. Every educational system is a political means of maintaining or of modifying the appropriation of discourse, with the knowledge and the powers it carries with it. (Foucault 1972, p. 227)

... Foucault's work, including the later work focussed on governmentality, offers hints, fragments and building blocks for a genealogy of pedagogical practice and knowledge. At the core of the enterprise as Foucault conducts it there is, of course, the linkage between investigation and problematisation. What is it that we wish to problematise when we study the genealogy of education? (Gordon 1991, p. 200)

I want to do three things in this chapter. First, to think about education, or perhaps more precisely schooling, as one nexus of Foucault's three vectors of analysis or 'aspects of experience'—truth, power, and subjectivity and their 'messy interactions' (Olssen 2006, p. 185). Second, to consider how the changing emphases between these vectors in Foucault's oeuvre can enable us to think about education differently. Bearing in mind that 'neither are reduced one to the other nor absorbed one by the others, but whose relations are constitutive of one another' (cited in Flynn 2005, p. 262). Taking up some of the 'hints, fragments and building blocks

for a genealogy of pedagogical practice and knowledge’ that Gordon notes above, I put these vectors to work in relation to a exploratory and very provisional genealogy of pedagogy and the school (see Chap. 2 for a discussion of genealogy as a method), and use Foucault’s tools to re-work or revise Foucault’s analysis of the school. That is, I want to say something about pedagogy in relation to truth, the institution of the modern school in relation to power, and the neoliberal school and neoliberal education in relation to subjectivity. I will also give some examples of the way in which the possibilities of these analyses have been taken up in the sociology of education. Third, and briefly, I will consider what such analyses mean in terms of education as a philosophical practice, and suggest, as far as the early and mid period work of Foucault is concerned, in relation to his strident anti-humanism, that education is impossible. Rather what we call education is a complex of power relations concerned with the manufacture and management of individuals and the population—a key space of regulation or biopower. The school is one of those sites where the body and population meet, where normality confronts degeneracy. The population becomes ‘a sort of technical-political object of management and government’ (Foucault 2009, p. 70).¹

The population spans everything from the biological substrate, through species- life, to the graspable surface of the public. From the species to the public; we have here a whole field of new realities, realities in the sense that they are pertinent elements for mechanisms of power, the pertinent space within which and on which one must act. (Ibid p. 75)

Foucault and Education

Deacon (2006) points out that only in two short texts does Foucault ‘focus primarily and almost exclusively on education’ (p. 178),² and that ‘to date no text has marshaled together in one place all of Foucault’s references to the field’ (p. 178). However, he also suggests that Foucault’s detailed studies of madness, punishment, sexuality and the human sciences provide concepts, techniques and arguments of very great relevance to educational studies. As Devine-Eller says ‘Though Foucault himself never wrote an extended history of education, he could easily have’ (Devine-Eller 2004, p. 1).

On the other hand, Hoskin (1990) argues that Foucault was a ‘crypto-educationalist and that *learning under examination* is a key element of his analytic’. Hoskin argues that ‘What we may well need to consider is how “the educational” may in different epochs, in different ways, function as the hyphen in the power/knowledge relation’ (p. 51). Power/knowledge demands, Hoskin asserts, ‘a third term’ (p. 52) and ‘can that third term properly be other than an educational

¹Perhaps, as Patrick Bailey suggested to me, this points up the tension in Foucault’s work between his historical narratives of power and the analyses of complexes of power—dispositifs.

²In addition Foucault’s later work address education in the classical period in a number of ways.

term?’—examination. I take this up to some extent below but in a different way from that intended by Hoskin when I consider the possible difference between the examination and the test as bases for teacher expertise. Allen (2014) makes a similar point to Hoskin when he says ‘The cold objective tools of modern examination would seem to epitomize the modern perspective’ (p. 15). I am not entirely convinced by that and will try out for size a slightly different and more orthodox argument focused on expertise as the third term between power and knowledge.

The work that contains the most and most direct references to education, or more correctly to the school as an institution is *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault 1979). This book, and its analysis of the modern institution, has generated a huge number of sociological and philosophical papers (e.g. Ball 2001; Besley 2005; Edwards 2002; Evans and Holroyd 2004; Green 1998; Perryman 2006; Peters 2001; Popkewitz 1998). In these terms the school is quintessentially a disciplinary institution which through the organization and division of space and time and the concomitant organisation and division of learners formed a key part of the new urban landscape of late 18th early 19th centuries as a constituent of the urban grid of power. The rhythms, repetitions and cycles of the school produced an ‘anatomo-chronological schema’ firmly rooted in the modern *episteme*,³ alongside, drawing from and feeding into the work of prisons, hospitals and factories. Alongside hospitals, prisons, welfare offices and local government, schools literally and in effect constituted the architecture of the modern state, as a ‘disposition of space for economico-political ends’ (Foucault 1979, p. 148), drawing on existing disciplinary/pastoral/pedagogical practices and new disciplinary knowledges (see below). The school emerged as a regional institution in a more general network of power, as part of the ‘geo-politics’ of ‘the carceral city’ (p. 307). Schooling is a perfect example of what Foucault called the ‘daemonic’ coupling of the ‘city game’ and the ‘shepherd-game’ (Gordon 1991, p. 8) with teachers as a ‘secular political pastorate’. Thus, Foucault suggests: ‘The town posed new and specific economic and political problems of government technique’ (Foucault 2009, p. 64) and that in response a ‘very complex technology of securities appeared’ (p. 64), of which the school became a key element; a particular site in which cleanliness, order and productivity could be addressed.

The methodology of schooling is a materiality of power. On the one hand, the power of bricks and mortar. As Hunter (1996, p. 147) puts it ‘it is not educational principles that are central to the role of education systems but school premises’. On the other, there is the materiality of bodies and of social events—and a set of techniques and practices; the diagnosis, the confession, the classroom question, and as noted already, the examination. The body is ‘the inscribed surface’ of educational events and it ‘bears and manifests the effects of regulating discourses’ (Foucault 1984, p. 82).

³An episteme is the system of concepts that defines knowledge for a given intellectual era, the conditions of possibility for knowledge. What Foucault also called the ‘intellectual subconscious’ of scientific disciplines.

In the late 19th century new technologies of measurement and examination quickly gave rise to a proliferation of 'scholastic accountancy'. As Donald (1992, p. 31) says: 'there was nothing covert or mysterious about these techniques. They were built into the very structure and routine of the schools'. Learners are 'seen' and 'modified' and 'broken down', by age and sometimes by gender, by ability, by 'need', in relation to talents or capabilities or forms of specialty or abnormality. Foucault draws our attention to these mundane processes and quotidian practices, the minute institutional divisions and categorisations and 'the little tactics of habit' (1979, p. 149) that are part of 'an apparatus of total and circulating mistrust' (ibid p. 158). Schooling was built literally on the contradictory bases of uniformity and individuality, a collectivist vision mediated within the methodologies of division and differentiation.

Take for an example an educational institution: the disposal of its space, the meticulous regulations which govern its internal life, the different activities which are organized there, the diverse persons who live there or meet one another, each with his own functions, his well-defined character-all these things constitute a block of capacity-communication-power. The activity which ensures apprenticeship and the acquisition of aptitudes or types of behavior is developed there by means of a whole ensemble of regulated communications (lessons, questions and answers, orders, exhortations, coded signs of obedience, differentiation marks of the value of each person and of the levels of knowledge) and by the means of a whole series of power processes (enclosure, surveillance, reward and punishment, the pyramidal hierarchy). (Foucault 1982, pp. 218–219)

Indeed, the very idea of the school, its materiality, its imaginary, its articulation within policy and practice came to be centered on and enacted in terms of a machinery of differentiation and classification, and concomitantly of exclusion. Power was literally made visible and visceral as architecture and space, and as practices of division and exclusion.⁴ The power of discipline is 'one of analysis' (Foucault 1979, p. 197) to locate and separate, that is 'power organizes an analytic space' (p. 143) a 'cellular space' and a 'therapeutic space' (p. 144), a space of 'precision' (p. 143) and distribution. Here power produces reality as a domain of objects articulated in specific rituals of truth. As highlighted by Hoskin and Allen, Foucault says the school became in the 19th century an 'apparatus of uninterrupted examination' (1979, p. 186), the examination was the main mechanism of simultaneous evaluation and comparison 'woven into [the school] through a constantly repeated ritual of power' (1979, p. 186). While the learner is made visible in all of this power is rendered invisible. The learner sees only the tasks and the tests which they must undertake as a subject in the 'eye of power' (Foucault 1980). This is very different from the 'sovereign' and 'episodic' exercise of power. Here power is an everyday, socialised and embodied phenomenon and this provides the basis of what Michael Gallagher calls 'Orwellian readings of Foucault' (<http://socialtheoryapplied.com/2013/04/04/using-foucault-in-school-research-thinking-beyond-the-panopticon/>, accessed 27.07.16).

⁴It is in relation to the struggles and conflicts around such exclusion that the *political force* of knowledge (Hook 2007). *Foucault, Psychology and the Analytics of Power*. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. p. 142) comes into view.

Schools via their own ‘arbitrary cruelties’ were beginning in the late 19th century to assume their intermediary socializing and civilising role between family and work. Government and opportunity, capability and freedom were juxtaposed in the ‘positive liberty’ of state schooling. The school developed in relation to a *reluctant* but *necessary* state and a set of uneasy relationships between the state, the teacher and the parent as a modern *dispositif* of government. This was set within a distribution and re-distribution of *responsibilities for governing and means and techniques for governing*. In the 19th century, in a whole myriad of ways, the state began to assume *responsibility* for its citizens. Concomitantly, Foucault argued inside the institutions of responsibility, of which the school was one; ‘Technical social science began to take form within the context of administration’ (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, p. 134). That is, a new agent and means of government emerged—the professional expert. Foucault outlined a diabolical interplay between the modern institution and professional knowledge. I will to come back to this shortly.

Government in the 19th century, as the ‘political technology of the body’ (Foucault 1979, p. 26), was increasingly concerned with the minds and bodies of its populace, and their wellbeing, as an indicator and facilitator of the wellbeing of the nation and its security. Specifically social and education policy was a response to the *urban* problem. However, as Foucault goes on to argue, there is not just one form of power emerging here in relation to the problem of the urban but two. Not just *discipline* but also *regulation*. There are two techniques and two politics involved here and we need to attend to both, and to their relations. Disciplinary power, on the one hand, which focuses on the individual body, concerned with the ‘disciplinary technology of individual dressage’ (Stoler 1995, p. 82) and regulatory power, on the other hand, which is concerned with the life of the body of the species, and is ‘globalizing’ rather than individualizing. This latter is the ‘bio-regulation of the state’, and is concerned with the internal dangers to society at large (Stoler 1995, p. 82). Much of the sociological work that ‘uses’ Foucault in relation to the analysis of schooling attends to the former and neglects the latter (see Ball 2013).

Indeed, education policy is a very good example of Foucault’s point that ‘Population comes to appear above all else to be the ultimate end of government’ (Gordon 1991, p. 100) as a resource (see Chap. 2). The population as a resource is garnered and nurtured within ‘the mundane objectives of the administrative state—social order, economic prosperity, social welfare’ (Hunter 1996, p. 153). This was a new type of political rationality and practice which ‘no longer sought to achieve the good life nor merely to aid the prince, but to increase the scope of power for its own sake by bringing the bodies of the state’s subjects under tighter discipline’ (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, p. 137)—making them ‘sober, healthy and competitive’ (Jones 1990, p. 68). The population comes to be ‘considered as a set of processes to be managed at the level and on the basis of what is natural ...’ (ibid p. 70). The population becomes ‘a sort of technical-political object of management and government’ (ibid p. 70). In the 4th lecture in the series *Security, Territory, Population*, Foucault named

this new form of government ‘governmentality’, what he calls a ‘singular generality’,⁵ and begins to refer to ‘the governmentalization’ of the state’ (Foucault 2009, p. 109) which, he goes on to say, ensures the survival of and defines the limits of the state.⁶ We thus have the series: ‘security—population—government’ (p. 88), as opposed to, say, ‘discipline—subjects—territorial sovereignty’.

This new series was played out in a whole variety of sites of regulation. ‘The watchword now became National Efficiency, a programme for redefining and extending the powers of the state through reforms in government, industry and social organization, as well as education’ (Donald 1992, p. 27). This is a shift, as Foucault referred to it, from *territory* to *security* and he looked at scarcity (the movement of goods), town planning, the management of epidemics, as examples of the sorts problems and responses to them that formed the modern state in relation to population, and he considers in particular the role of statistics in mediating and facilitating the relations of state and population, which are articulated in a set of ‘new notions’ in their field of application—that is, ‘case, risk, danger and crisis’ (2009, p. 61). He goes on to say that these are all linked to the phenomenon of the town itself’ (p. 63). As Rose (1999, p. 232) puts it:

In analyses of democracy, a focus on numbers is instructive, for it helps us turn our eyes from the grand texts of philosophy to the mundane practices of pedagogy, of counting, of information and polling, and to the mundane knowledges of “grey sciences” that support them.

Foucault suggests that ‘there is one element that will circulate between the disciplinary and the regulatory’ and which will ‘make it possible to control both the disciplinary order of the body and the aleatory events that occur in the biological multiplicity’ (2004, p. 253)—that is the norm. This intersection produces what he called ‘a normalizing society’ within which ‘power took possession of life’ (p. 253).

⁵This 4th lecture was published separately (Green 1998). Born-Again Teaching? Governmentality, “Grammar” and Public Schooling. In T.S. Popkewitz & M. Brennan (Eds.), *Foucault's Challenge: Discourse, Knowledge and Power in Education*. New York: Teachers College Press. Its take-up gave impetus to what is sometimes called ‘governmentality studies’ which is one of the most widespread and productive fields in which Foucault’s work has been taken forward.

⁶At the end of this fourth lecture Foucault adds a coda which links this new form of analysis back to the work he undertook in *The Order of Things* on the emergence of the modern human sciences—biology, economics and linguistics. He suggests that ‘a constant interplay between techniques of power and their object gradually carves out in reality, as a field of reality, population and its specific phenomena. A whole series of objects were made visible for possible forms of knowledge ...’ (1970, p. 79). Specifically, the possibilities for knowledges of man; the human subject is a 19th Century production for it is then ‘that human forces confront purely finitary forces—life, production, language—in such a way that the resulting composite is a form of Man’ (Deleuze 1995, p. 99). Here is another point of intersection between archaeology and genealogy. In *Security, Territory and Population*—where Foucault suggests a recontextualisation of the core themes of *The Order of Things* and indeed also revisits, in an unusually direct way, part of the agenda of his 1970 inaugural lecture, *The Order of Discourse*, Foucault rapidly outlines a view of how the changing regimes of knowledge of life, labour and language respectively entered into, and became stakes in historico-political debates and struggles over race, class and nation.

Central to processes of classification Foucault argues, and in a specific relation to statistics (e.g. the bell curve) is *normalisation*, ‘the primary and fundamental character of the norm’ (1979, p. 57), as a standard that unifies practice. The norm is the point of concatenation—‘normalization becomes one of the great instruments of power at the end of the classical age’ (1979, p. 184). Power here is the subtle and meticulous control of bodies rather than the deployment of ethical or judicial judgements. This is the point at which anatomo-politics and biopolitics are articulated (Foucault 1980, p. 139). ‘The norm is what can be applied to both the body that desires discipline, as well as to the population that desires regularization’ (Foucault 2004, p. 262).

These themes and representations of *modern* education remain as pertinent now as they did in the 19th century. The school as a panopticon (Gallagher 2010), the school as surveillance (Hope 2015), the school as a machinery of classifications (Scheer 2011). That is all well and good, and in many ways a very convincing and an eminently ‘useful’ critique of the institution of the school as a vehicle of government, but is it subtle enough? The school and the hospital and the prison maybe equivalent as sites of government, but are they isomorphic? Can we ‘usefully’ introduce some nuances into the analysis of the modern school? As Gutting suggests Foucault’s ‘analyses are effective precisely because they are specific to the particular terrain of the discipline he is challenging’ (1994, p. 3). Perhaps after all it is dangerous to think about schools simply as though they were prisons.

Here I want to both use and trouble Foucault’s analysis, and in particular the way it has been taken up by sociologists, to sketch out a somewhat different genealogy of the school; one that explores the articulation of power/knowledge in a different way, in a specific relation to pedagogy and the teacher; and one that unpacks the hyphen (power/knowledge) in relation to the teacher and the teacher’s expertise.

Liberal governing, according to Rose, depends on the State’s authorization of expert technologies (like the examination—in its various meanings) as forms of authority and these play a key role in the alignment of the political aims of the State with the strategies of experts, as well as the linking of the ‘calculations of authorities with the aspirations of free citizens’ (Rose 1999, pp. 48–49). Indeed, Rose and Miller (1992, p. 173) assert that ‘modern political rationalities and governmental technologies are shown to be linked (my emphasis) to developments in knowledge and to the powers of expertise’. The knowledges, technologies and training provided by the human sciences for the formation of state professionals construct a relationship of management (discipline and regulation) between professionalism and population. ‘The emergence of social science cannot, as you see, be isolated from the rise of this new political rationality, and from this new political technology’ (Martin et al. 1988, p. 162). That is to say, teachers, social workers, sanitary engineers, doctors were certificated as state actors and enactors of the state, bringing the gaze of the state to bear upon individual bodies and the population as a whole.

What I offer here is a tactical analysis—an ‘imperfect sketch’ (Foucault 1972, p. 15)—starting from the problem of the teacher as a state professional in order to

open insights into our educational present. That is, I will explore different modes of pedagogy, as different ways in which we are made subject by and subject to education. This will involve addressing a fundamental and debilitating paradox of contemporary educational practice, the basis of which is to some extent already in place. Sharp and Green (1975), Bernstein (1996) and Foucault (1979) himself have all suggested that ‘new’ or *progressive* educational forms contain the possibility of a more effective ‘conduct of conduct’ than prior *disciplinary* techniques of pedagogy, through the production of a self managing learner who is attached to the goals of education not through ‘methods of correct training’ but through forms of freedom—choice and self-determination in the classroom. In effect, these progressive methods both open up more of the learner to the pedagogic gaze and encourage the learner to take greater responsibility for their own ‘progress’ and improvement—to manage themselves and their learning. This is signaled, for instance, in the most recent reiteration of power/knowledge as pedagogy, that is the discursive shift in policy and expert knowledges from an emphasis on teaching to a focus on learning. Barr and Tagg (1995) offer one rendition of this shift, and adumbrate its entanglement with the *neoliberalisation* of education. A UNESCO document *A Shift from Teaching to Learning* (http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/ev.php-URL_ID=26923&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html, accessed 27.07.16) indicates something of what is at stake for teachers and for students in this shift.

Shifting the emphasis from teaching to learning can create a more interactive and engaging learning environment for teachers and learners. This new environment also involves a change in the roles of both teachers and students ... the role of the teacher will change from knowledge transmitter to that of learning facilitator, knowledge guide, knowledge navigator and co-learner with the student. The new role does not diminish the importance of the teacher but requires new knowledge and skills. Students will have greater responsibility for their own learning in this environment as they seek out, find, synthesize, and share their knowledge with others.

Pedagogy, Truth and Expertise

As already noted, Foucault’s most extended discussion of education is in the famous third section, ‘Discipline’, of *Discipline and Punish*. Some of the illustrative material in this section is drawn from one of the most influential French schooling manuals of the early modern period, De La Salle’s *Conduite des Écoles Chrétiennes*. Foucault seeks to establish the distinctive features of the pedagogical techniques outlined, as the methods shared with other kinds of institutions; thus, as quoted above he asks: ‘Is it surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, and hospitals, which themselves all resemble prisons?’ Nonetheless, his account of the idea of an educational ‘programme’ is not straightforward and also has elements drawn from religious institutions and relationships and long established traditions of moral and ascetic training.

The theme of a perfection towards which the exemplary master guides the pupil became with them that of an authoritarian perfection of the pupils by the teacher; the increasingly rigorous exercises that the ascetic life proposed became tasks of increasing complexity that marked the gradual acquisition of knowledge and good behaviour; the striving of the whole community towards salvation became the collective, permanent competition of individuals being classified in relation to one another. (Foucault 1979, pp. 161–2)

Perhaps we need to think about this in relation to another of Foucault's genealogies. In *Security, Territory, Population* we might read this example slightly differently. It seems to be that this is not a very clear cut case of the new forms of power and of the institution that Foucault seeks to adumbrate in *Discipline and Punish*, rather what we see here is a reiteration of older forms of pastoral power or perhaps a point of transition between two. Indeed, he says 'Importantly, despite the many strategic reversals and contestations over this form of power, the history of the pastorate as a technology of power is a history from which Western modernity, despite its secular pretensions, has by no means emerged' (2009, p. 165). That is, a 'secular theology'. In *Security, Territory, Population* Foucault undertakes 'an analysis and a bringing to light of the theological grounds of modern practices of power and political subjectivity' (Golder 2009, 157–75). Hunter (1996) makes this very clear in his discussion of what he terms 'spiritual discipline' and he makes two very important points. First, that the school is 'an improvised historical institution—assembled from the moral and material grab-bag of Western culture' (p. 148). Second, that "'critical" educational theory and history has sought to efface the "statist" and Christian lineages of the modern school system' (p. 162). Certainly most of the recent sociological applications of Foucault's analysis of disciplinary technologies to the school have written out 'the pastoral'.

There is also the difficulty here that *Discipline and Punish* and *Security, Territory, Population* mark a point of transition in Foucault's work, a shift in his conceptualisation of power, both its genealogy and its practice, which offer slightly different possible readings of the emergence and the methods of the 19th century state. While *Discipline and Punish* focuses on institutions and disciplinary power, *Security, Territory, Population* focuses on population, *governmentality* and a genealogy of pastoral power. The pastorate he asserts is 'one of the decisive moments in the history of power in Western societies' (p. 185) and argues elsewhere: 'we can see the state as a modern matrix of individualization, or a new form of pastoral power' (Foucault 1982, p. 111). That is to say, while Foucault is relatively clear that while the Christian pastorate forms both the 'background' (p. 165) and the 'prelude' (p. 184) to more recognizably modern forms of government, and that these latter formations 'arise on the basis' of it (p. 193), he is nevertheless not describing a 'massive, comprehensive transfer of pastoral functions from Church to state' (p. 229). In all of this, the technical expertise of the pastor remains somewhat elusive. Pastoral practice is articulated not on the basis of esoteric knowledge but as Foucault observes, '[t]he pastor must really take charge of and observe daily life in order to form a never-ending knowledge of the behavior and conduct of the members of the flock he supervises' (p. 181). The pastor's concern is with the 'spiritual direction' [*direction de conscience*] of the thoughts of

his flock—a set of practices that generate ‘a truth which binds one to the person who directs one’s conscience’ (p. 183). The relation of all of this to something we might call pedagogy is unclear.

Nonetheless, by starting with pastoral power, rather than with discipline, we might be able to think about pedagogy as a human science, not with the historical sweep of Foucault’s *The Order of Things* (1970) but more specifically focussed on ‘the threshold of modernity that we have not yet left behind’—that is focused on the modern school. There will not be space here to address what Foucault (p. x) calls the pedagogical ‘calendar of saints and heroes’ (like those referred to in *Discipline and Punish*) who contributed to the emergence of ‘methods of teaching’, and rather I want to place pedagogy in some kind of relation to those Human Sciences that Foucault addresses in *The Order of Things*⁷—economics, linguistics and biology. As Foucault might put it I am only seeking to ‘open up’ this question as a site for further work.⁸

With some latitude it maybe possible to argue that pedagogy does earn its place in the modern *dispositif*, alongside the other human sciences, ‘as what might have been said at the same time’ (that is as having an epistemic resemblance), and in relation to the analysis Foucault lays out in the above. That is to say, in relation to population as a political problem and as the ‘subject-object’ fundamental to the emergence of economics, linguistics and biology—and quite clearly also pedagogy. Might we also glimpse some commonalities in the ‘rules of formation’ and ‘systems of regulatives’ which extend across the ‘representations’ of economics, linguistics and biology and include pedagogy in the 19th century? That is, we can extend the field of investigation of the human sciences to include ‘man in so far as he lives, speaks and produces’ (1970, p. 351) and learns. Indeed, Foucault himself raises this possibility in *Discipline and Punish* when he says: ‘The school became the place for elaboration for pedagogy ... the age of the “examining school” marks the beginnings of a pedagogy that functions as a science’ (Foucault 1979, p. 187). Pedagogy, that is, despite its ‘invincible impression of haziness, inexactitude and imprecision’ (1970, p. 355) produces a space in which that ‘strange figure of knowledge’ (p. xxiv)—the learner, appears.

As Foucault suggests, the human sciences enabled modern power to circulate through finer channels. They colonised and operated within the institutions of modern power in particular ways. Through their knowledges and technologies, and in and through those institutions, in this case the school and the teacher, they made certain forms of practice possible, indeed necessary. They structured ways of knowing and exercising power that brought into existence esoteric regimes of

⁷In *The Order of Things*, Foucault is concerned primarily with three disciplines that emerged in the nineteenth century: philology, biology, and economics.

⁸I do recognise that pedagogy fails many of the ‘tests’ of coherence that Foucault suggests for what might be considered a human science. He was interested in disciplines on the ‘threshold of scientificity’ (1972, pp. 186–89), a threshold that pedagogy may never have crossed.

power/knowledge. We can recognize many of these technologies and knowledges still at work in the contemporary school, as evidence of their effectiveness and continuing anonymous necessity. They are embedded in a broader complex of discourses and practices through which childhood and the pupil are ‘made up’, and normalized, what MacNaughton (2005, p. 30) calls ‘officially sanctioned developmental truths of the child’.

However, there is also a problem here, or rather two problems; one with regard to the extent to which the school is simply a modern institution, as noted above, and relatedly the extent of the transition that state education represented from what had existed previously; and one with regard to the extent to which the teacher was able, and is able, to make claims to expertise and instead perhaps remains teetering insecurely on ‘the edges of the rift’ (1970, p. 250) that ‘isolates for us the beginning of a modern manner of knowing empiricities’ (p. 250). In other words, it may be that teaching remains caught in the ‘impossibility’ of knowledge, played out in the 18th century, which is both representative and quasi-transcendental but not *modern*.

So to address these problems I want to erect a ramshackle and tentative periodization of pedagogical knowledge and practice—in an unstable relation to Foucault’s own epistemic periodization and his shifting analysis of power/knowledge. I will call these pedagogical periods *early and late modern, progressive and neoliberal*. The first two and the last, in different but related ways, are very clearly focused on economic and political necessities. Progressive pedagogies, exist in a kind of interregnum, as partly subjugated knowledges which when operational articulate the teacher and the teacher’s expertise and relation to knowledge in a different way to the others, but also although less clearly, in relation to changing political and economic necessities. Progressivism also, concomitantly, rests on and is realised within relations of power in the classroom but in ways different from the ‘pedagogies’ that preceded it—indeed this may be an intensification of power. This heuristic periodization also highlights the point noted above about ‘reversal and returns’ in the genealogy of power. Dean (2010, p. 57) makes the point that genealogy is not just about variation and discontinuity to also ‘to show that the past is not so different from today in certain respects’. I am not intending to signal sharp breaks or ruptures, but rather messy and uneven shifts in emphasis and changing combinations of possibility. There is overtime an accumulation, concatenation and interplay of techniques and modes of power within the classroom. So, for example, spectacular public punishments, exercised directly on ‘the body of the condemned’ remained commonplace in schools until the 1960s, wherein bad behaviour was subject to reparation rather than ‘understood’. As Bailey (2015) explains:

the histories of policy, power and governmentality, taken both separately and together, are ones of multiple lines of descent, of overlap, transformation, transposition, and sometimes even reversals and returns. There is an ‘acetate effect’ to power and government—material and epistemological remnants and relics of previous regimes may remain rather than disappearing in the shifts from one singularity to another, and power is a heterogeneous phenomenon.

My concern here then is with *what might be* a science of teaching, and the role of esoteric knowledge in relation to pedagogy. That is, pedagogical knowledges as ways of knowing and representing the learner. Concomitantly, the first demarcation (between early and late modern) rests on a fine distinction between the ‘examination’ and the ‘test’, between representation and signification, between enumeration and mathematization, between seriation and capacity, and between discipline and regulation, between anatomo and bio.

The examination is one way of representing the child, ‘the pinning down of each individual in his own particularity’ (1979, p. 192)⁹ and as the ‘constant exchanger of knowledge; it guaranteed the movement of knowledge from teacher to the pupil’ (p. 187) but while the examination is about what the pupil *knows*; ‘the test’ (as I am using the term here) is the attempt to know what the pupil *is*. As Foucault says the examination is an ‘economy of visibility’ (Foucault 1979, p. 187) a form of ‘compulsory visibility’—very much focused in his account on the *seriation* of activities and characterising of individuals, rather than, in practice, attempts to discover their ‘ultimate capacity’ (p. 160). The examination is a technique of ‘fixing’ (p. 189), of transcription, while, I suggest, the test seeks to access ‘development’ and capacity and to some extent uniqueness. The examination marks, while the test explains. The examination ranks, while the test identifies a distribution in relation to the norm. In some ways here we see the overlay of classical (or indeed very ancient) and modern forms of representation, which continues in our contemporary education—as a ‘field of knowledge that is not yet definitively established’ (1970, p. 240). While the examination has its basis in ‘displayed descriptability’ (1970, p. 237)—(see 1979, p. 190), the test suggests and produces ‘a certain internal architecture’ (1970, p. 237) that is ‘outside representation, beyond its immediate visibility, in a sort of behind-the-scenes world even deeper and more dense than representation itself’ (p. 239)—that is *intelligence*, or at ‘the very heart of things’—genetics. This involves, as Foucault puts it, an escape ‘from the space of the table’ (p. 239) to an ‘internal space’ that shatters ‘the space of order ... the grid of identities and differences’ (p. 239). While, it is Foucault’s argument that the examination assures ‘continuous genetic accumulation ... and thereby the fabrication of cellular, organic, genetic and combinatory individuality’ (1979, p. 192), this might be a better description of the test.

Perhaps also we can think about this in terms of attempts to ‘mathematize’ (1970, p. 245) the understanding of intelligence, in its relation to distribution across the population, over and against the a posteriori empirical sciences ‘which employ the deductive forms only in fragments and in strictly localized regions’ (p. 246)—like classroom practices. Here there is a tension between psychology or eugenics and pedagogy. Here is the unstable basis of the teacher as professional, in the

⁹He goes on to say ‘in contrast with the ceremony in which status, birth privilege, function are manifested with all the spectacle of their marks’, and yet the history of the sociological analysis of schooling rests exactly on the continuation of the play of privilege in relation to judgement and achievement.

absence of well-grounded claims to expertise. The gaze of the examination is relatively superficial, whereas the test aims to reveal something profound about the learner, their nature and their capabilities. The examination produces ‘the collective, permanent, competition of individuals being classified in relation to one another’ (1979, p. 162); it is the test that introduces the ‘penalty the norm’ (p. 183). In a way Foucault conflates the examination with the test and in making schools like prisons and prisons like schools gives primary emphasis to power rather than to power/knowledge, at least in its broader sense.

While it was argued that ‘The pedagogic object of elementary education was to understand the nature of children and then develop their faculties to their fullest potential’ (Tate 1857 cited in Larsen 2011) in practice schoolteachers were selected and trained as ‘ethical exemplars’, of a kind. They were trained to be ‘virtuous’ rather than ‘over-educated’ (Jones 1990, p. 62). They were discursively positioned as both ‘modern’ and ‘moral’ (Larsen 2011), as bastions against chaos and social disorder. They would bring the children of the urban masses under their ‘moral observation’ (Donald 1992). As with the asylum, the schools sought ‘to impose, in a universal form, a morality that will prevail from within upon those who were strangers to it’ (Foucault 2001, p. 246). This is what Jones (1990, p. 66) calls a ‘technology of morality’ or ‘scientific morality’ based in a form of teacher training in which ‘the inculcation of techniques of self-regulation far outweighed the teacher’s intellectual training’ (p. 62). Indeed, rather than an expert the 19th century teacher is both qualified and selected primarily in terms of their moral probity, as father and Judge (Foucault 2001, p. 259), as pastor rather than pedagogue. Rather than their capability to understand the learner they were expected to guide the conduct and the spirit of the child. In *Madness and Civilization* (2001), Foucault makes a similar point about the 18th century asylum (pp. 258–60). Indeed, this early modern pedagogy may have parallel’s with Tuke’s ‘moral therapy’—Foucault argues that the “moral” asylum is ‘not a free realm of observation, diagnosis, and therapeutics; it is a juridical space where one is accused, judged, and condemned’. Moral treatment was an approach to mental disorder based on humane psychosocial care or moral discipline that emerged in the 18th century and came to the fore for much of the 19th century, deriving partly from psychiatry or psychology and partly from religious or moral concerns. The anguish of bourgeois morality ‘substituted for the free terror of madness the stifling anguish of responsibility’ (Foucault 2006a, p. 582).

Pedagogy remained in the 19th century, and even perhaps today, locked in some version of what Foucault calls a ‘double affirmation—alternating or simultaneous—of being able and not being able to formalize the empirical’ (1970, p. 246)—despite various attempts of different kinds, at different points in time, to establish some basis for formalisation and its location in ‘the norms of positivism’ (2001, p. 260). Articulated within the ‘fracturing’ of forms of representation in the 19th century, the teacher is not constituted by expertise, by esoteric bodies of knowledge, but almost entirely by practices, methods of conduct and by their moral responsibilities. The teacher’s practice fails to become obscure (2001, p. 261); no clear ‘pedagogical

personage' (2001, p. 263) emerges.¹⁰ There is no science of pedagogy within which the professionalism of the teacher is embedded and legitimated, rather the claims of teacher 'expertise', in the 19th century and now, are based on two forms of practice; one of experience and moral probity and the other of performance and outcome measurement. In the 19th century (as payment by results) and again in the contemporary period (as performance related pay) both are reductive and de-professionalising. Indeed, for teacher and learner, this is a reversion to 'the table' as 'the ground for all possible orders, the matrix of all relations, the form in accordance with which all beings are distributed in their singular individuality' (1970, p. 251). Both teacher and learner are represented within this visible order, *the taxinomia* of the classroom. Here there is no depth, no mystery 'blurred and darkened by its obscurity' (1970, p. 251) but a simple relation between outcomes and observation, the surface visibility of practice, made apparent in 'observations', learning walks, and inspections—this is all about the visible and what can be recorded as 'the effect of a patterning process—a mere classifying boundary' (1970, p. 268) between the unsatisfactory and the outstanding, in the criteria for a 'good' lesson, in four parts or seven. The school in this sense is 'a homogenous space of orderable identities and differences' (1970, p. 268).

Performance measurement holds its subjects 'in a mechanism of objectification' (1970, p. 187), a ceremony of power 'manifest only by its gaze' (p. 188). Again, in passing Foucault seems to note a point of difference between the examination which 'has remained extremely close to the disciplinary power that shaped it' (p. 226) and its:

... speculative purification by integrating itself with such sciences as psychology and psychiatry. And, in effect its appearance in the form of tests, interviews, interrogations and consultations is apparently in order to rectify the mechanisms of discipline; educational psychology is supposed to correct the rigours of the school... (Ibid p. 226)

In a sense, if we think about education and the school archeologically that may suggest something different from if we think about the school genealogically. In *Discipline and Punish* (1979, p. 191), Foucault asks the question whether 'procedures of writing and registration' the 'mechanisms of examination' and this 'new type of power over bodies', is 'the birth of the sciences of man', and yet in some ways, he fails to unpick the differences within the epistemology of the modern institution between fixity and *developmentalism*, and, in the school at least, the continuing interplay between status and calculation. That is, we may explore some possibilities for analysis in the gaps between some aspects of archaeology and some aspects of genealogy, between *The Order of Things* and *Discipline and Punish*. The point is not to find fault with Foucault but to use him by exploring a mismatch between the epistemic/archaeological analysis of the human sciences in *The Order of Things* and the genealogy of power in *Discipline and Punish*.

¹⁰The celebrations of great teachers remain rooted in personality and morality, in belief and trust and expectations rather than in science.

What I am suggesting is that we might think about the school in the 19th century not as the epitome of modernism but as a site of tensions between the classical and modern episteme.¹¹ For Foucault the modern institution ‘required the involvement of definite relations of knowledge in relations of power; it called for a technique of over-lapping subjection and objectification’ (1979, p. 305). That was not the case in the early modern school. Almost all sociological analysis that seeks to employ Foucault to interrogate the schools lean heavily on power rather than on power/knowledge [e.g. *Power Relations in Pedagogy* (Gore 1997)] in part at least this is the result of the absence of classroom techniques which rely upon objectification and intelligibility and the predominance of ‘means of correct training’, that is the absence of pedagogy as a human science.

Late Modern Pedagogy—Is no Pedagogy at All

Perhaps then we need to look elsewhere, other than to *discipline*, to grasp that which is *modern* about education. Following Foucault, a science of education begins to emerge within a different vector of power—that is *regulation* or biopower, the management of life itself, focused on the problem of population. This science sits at the intersection of reproduction and opportunity, the Janus face of educational politics. This is articulated within what Allen (2014) calls *meritocracies*—and ‘a connection between eugenic rationality and the pursuit of economic health’ (p. 145), indeed ‘an alignment between modes of power that defined interwar eugenic history’. I have discussed this as a ‘history of blood’ (Ball 2013) and Allen explores the complex relations in education between eugenics, economic efficiency and social mobility. He also contests Rose’s attempt to confine the specificity of eugenics to the first half of the 20th century (pp. 134–35)—I will come back to that. From these relations emerges what Jones (1990) calls ‘the bio-teacher’, and he goes on to note that:

In teacher-training courses inspected by the Board of Education after 1902, the syllabi in ‘Principles of teaching’ demonstrate a growing concern with the psychology of child development, hygiene, physical training, and housecraft. The teacher accordingly acted alongside the medical officer in ‘detecting and dealing with physically and mentally defective children’ and devising ‘methods of teaching hygiene to children’ (syllabus for the Boards 1905–14). (p. 73)

My concern is not to rehearse the history of eugenics but to make the point that it is at this point, focused on ‘intelligence’ and ‘the test’, that we see the initial traces of the modernity that Foucault sketches out in *The Order of Things*. It is here, in the practices of testing and statistics, in the ‘laboratory’ rather than the classroom, that we see the attempt to produce a science of education, in the esoteric knowledge of child

¹¹Henriques, Hollway et al. (2005, pp. 166–168) outline some aspects of shifts from a monitorial to what I have called an early modern pedagogy (pp. 166–168).

psychology, rather than in the quotidian techniques of examination. The ‘methods’ of eugenics act back on the classroom to construct certain possibilities of pedagogy and organization but in relation to a more general strategy of biopower—‘distributing the living in the domain of value and utility’ (Foucault 1981, p. 144). As Foucault argues, the modern state exercises its power, and governs, ‘through the administration of life; it is preoccupied with life itself, rather than death’ (Foucault 2009, cited in Ball 2013, p. 59). The role of eugenic psychology in the re-working of forms of state power is noted by Allen.

Cattell hoped that the scientific expert would replace an erstwhile pastorate in guiding us towards the social good. As he put it, ‘society must have an adequate supply of watchers in the field of sociological and psychological research in order that the consequences of modified moral laws may be accurately worked out’. (Allen 2014, p. 144)

It is here at the beginning of the 20th century that our phenomenological horizon is ruptured, opening up ‘man’ as an object of study, a focus for ‘objective’ scientific research. It is in this way that we begin to see ourselves and others as objects, as part of a new and contingent modality of being of western man.¹²

Even here we might raise doubts about how far eugenics had escaped from the classical form of knowledge and remained locked into an ‘old fixism’ (Foucault 1970, p. 274) and ‘the image of the continuous scale’ (p. 272), clinging ‘passionately to the immobility of things’ (p. 274). It might be said that there is a failure to engage with ‘life itself’ and to recognise the ‘discontinuity of livings forms’ (p. 275). The history of life itself—evolution—was transformed into a history of lives by developmental psychology rather than eugenics, and crucially in the former life was conceived in relation to ‘to the conditions of existence’ (p. 274)—the conditions of educability (see for example Floud and Halsey 1961). Henriques et al. (2005, p. 170) make this point, tracing the beginnings of the ‘child study movement’ to Darwin’s study of his own son—*A Biographical Sketch of an Infant* (1840, 1887). Perhaps taking the parallels with Foucault’s discussion of biology too far, it might be said that while eugenics ‘affirms, with the limits of the individual, the exigencies of his life’, developmentalism marks beneath ‘the murmuring of death’ (1970, p. 279).

‘The test’ and ‘intelligence’ clearly have a relationship to the ‘examination’, at least in mid 20th century England¹³ but the latter is, I suggest rooted in older pre-modern technologies, in teasing out a distinction between them, we can think about the ways in which pedagogy and psychology sit together both uneasily and seamlessly. Together they assure that regulation and discipline cover ‘the whole surface that lies between the organic and the biological’ (Foucault 2004, p. 253). But crucially, Foucault argues that ‘the one element that will circulate between the disciplinary and the population alike’ (p. 252) is the norm and all its statistical paraphernalia. In particular, the ‘normal curve had within it deep assumptions of

¹²This is as Foucault argues, the duality of man—as both an object in the world, an object of study, and an experiencing subject through which the world is constituted.

¹³11+ Norwood etc.

unity by which individuals could be compared on the same conceptual space to the entire population', a 'regime of truth' from which 'it has been almost impossible for any individual to escape' (Olssen 1993, p. 165).

This late modern pedagogy involves a move from 'reading' the child as a surface, to a depth psychology whereby the child is measured and known through the techniques of testing—uncovering the truth of the child. We find *ability or intelligence*, as an effect or articulation of the norm, produced at the heart of schooling, the very point at which teaching could articulate a form of knowledge which related pedagogy to population, and classroom practice to a general theory of management, distribution and entitlement. However, child psychology itself was also subject to change—a move from determinism to developmentalism. As Henriques et al. (2005, p. 4) put it:

... on the one side of the battle-field of psychology stood the forces of administrative regulation, grinding out the norms: IQ scores; taxonomies of skills; personality inventories; assessment of potential and motivation. On the other side stood the heroes of individual development and the brigades of free expression: spontaneity; self-expression; satisfaction.

Olssen (2006) outlines the similarities and differences between these two psychologies of individual differences. They are he says, 'both founded on biologism and an individualist bias' (p. 176); that is, set within and playing out the 'idea of possessive individualism' (p. 180) which has 'become axiomatic to liberal democratic thought (p. 180). But he contrasts the biological determinism of eugenics with cognitive development psychologies that 'accorded biology a less direct role but still conceptualised the individual as a unitary rational actor' (p. 181). The relationship to the teacher, and the teacher and pedagogy are constructed differently in each case.

Progressive Pedagogy (Bernstein 1990, p. 72)

I want to argue that the shift from measurement to developmentalism addresses an intensification of power which is more focused on the question of who we are and who we might become than our performances. That is, a new 'heterogeneous and indistinct' (Dean 2007, p. 91) form of power. As Nealon (2008) points out there are two possible readings of Foucault's later work, as either abandonment of power or its intensification, both readings are right (see Chap. 3).

There is an immediate and serious problem here. That is, the limits of space in relation to the complexity, history and heterogeneity of what might be understood as progressive pedagogy. All that is possible here is to gesture towards some of the distinctions—in terms of power, knowledge and subjectivity—between what I have called modern and progressive pedagogies. Most pertinently here, there is the relation of pedagogy to knowledge (esoteric knowledge on the one hand and knowledge of the child on the other, and their relation) and the fabrication of the teacher as some sort of expert, as a pedagogue.

Crudely I am suggesting here that we glimpse a version of the teacher as expert, a teacher who is able to deploy theoretically informed practice in the classroom. I will outline this in part by drawing upon Basil Bernstein, whose discussions of what he calls *invisible pedagogies*, have some kind of affinity with some aspects of Foucault's work on governmentality; and less directly on Henriques et al.'s (2005) seminal analysis of child-centred pedagogy and its relationships with developmental psychology. Their focus is primarily on the learner I want to think more about how this pedagogical move constituted and made historically possible a new kind of teacher—a pedagogue. To be clear, I am not referring here to the classical tradition of progressivism (see Larabee 2005)¹⁴ but rather a rough amalgam of some principles of progressivism with some of the insights of developmental psychology that were distilled into the preparation of teachers in the post-war Teacher Training College. This was never a coherent and unified body of knowledge, but drew loosely on the sociology, philosophy and psychology of education to construct a classroom imaginary superficially very different from the machinery of 19th century schooling. This was an imaginary and a set of practices and practical classroom arrangements that received in England a fragile and temporary state legitimisation in the *Plowden Report* (1967).¹⁵ The Report presented arguments for a new kind of schooling directly related to claims to the esoteric knowledge of child development.

9. At the heart of the educational process lies the child. No advances in policy, no acquisitions of new equipment have their desired effect unless they are in harmony with the nature of the child, unless they are fundamentally acceptable to him. We know a little about what happens to the child who is deprived of the stimuli of pictures, books and spoken words; we know much less about what happens to a child who is exposed to stimuli which are perceptually, intellectually or emotionally inappropriate to his age, his state of development, or the sort of individual he is. We are still far from knowing how best to identify in an individual child the first flicker of a new intellectual or emotional awareness, the first readiness to embrace new sets of concepts or to enter into new relations.

10. Knowledge of the manner in which children develop, therefore, is of prime importance, both in avoiding educationally harmful practices and in introducing effective ones. In the last 50 years much work has been done on the physical, emotional and intellectual growth of children. There is a vast array of facts, and a number of general principles have been established.

As David Gillard explains the context in which the report was written and read:

The context in which the Committee worked was characterised by an increasingly liberal view of education and society. 'Plowden's membership and terms of reference were a product of the optimism and belief in social engineering of its time' (Kogan 1987).

¹⁴**Progressive education** is a pedagogical movement that began in the late nineteenth century; it has persisted in various forms to the present. Progressive education can be traced back to the works of John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, both of whom are known as forerunners of ideas that would be developed by theorists such as John Dewey.

¹⁵The **Plowden Report** is the unofficial name for the 1967 **report** of the Central Advisory Council For Education (England) into Primary education in England. The **report**, entitled *Children and their Primary Schools* reviewed Primary education in a wholesale fashion.

Selection for secondary education (the ‘eleven-plus’) was being abolished, freeing primary schools from the constraints imposed by the need to ‘get good results’. Streaming (sorting children into classes on the basis of ability or overall intelligence) was being abandoned. Marshall (1963) was writing about the creativity of primary pupils in ‘An Experiment in Education’. Comprehensive schools and middle schools were being established. Teacher-led curriculum innovation was being actively encouraged. Plowden was very much a product of its time, full of enthusiasm and optimism.

(http://www.infed.org/schooling/plowden_report.htm, accessed 27th May 2016).

Here was a language and a framework of perception which represented the learner differently, indeed which brought learning to the fore, which raised questions about the curriculum as an experience, and encouraged the teacher to reflect on their purpose and practice in the classroom. Here the teacher was being formed in a relation to practice rather than simply within practice. Pedagogy became a matter of deliberation and judgement rather than a pre-given relation to the student. As Henriques et al. (2005, p. 164) put it, ‘progressivism was at once made possible by specific sciences but was the result of a ‘precarious congruence’ (Donald 1979, p. 17) in which regulation, classification and liberation coexisted as simultaneous possibilities.

This simultaneity and what Gillard calls the liberal context, may be seen more generally as part of what Bernstein calls ‘the social logic’ of *competence* (Bernstein 1996, p. 55), which was, he suggests, evident in ‘a remarkable convergence [that] took place in the field of the social and psychological sciences’ (p. 54) in the 1960s. He sums this logic up as: ‘An inbuilt procedural democracy, an in-built creativity, an in-built virtuous self-regulation’ (p. 56). This was an intellectual field, he argues, ‘whose authors had little or no initial connection with education, came to play such a central role in the theory and practice of education’ (p. 57)¹⁶—Piaget is key to education here. This is where I suggest the expertise of the teacher was produced, within this intellectual field, however uncertainly, and as it turned out temporarily.¹⁷ Bernstein asserts that ‘competence modes became dominant positions in the PRF [pedagogical recontextualisation field—teacher education, educational research and educational media] in the late 1960s’ (1996, p. 70), institutionalised in England by the publication of the Plowden report (1969) *Children: Their Primary Schools*. Perhaps in Foucault’s terms, this is a new ‘intellectual subconscious’ for education, a shift in the possibilities of pedagogical knowledge, within which the relation of the teacher to student and what it means to teach and to learn are re-designated.

¹⁶To some extent Foucault was part of this new logic and his writing contributed to liberatory moves especially as it was taken up within the anti-psychiatry movement.

¹⁷Bernstein goes on to adumbrate a set of variations or modes within the general model (progressive, populist and radical)—I am interested in the model rather than the modes here. But he says all three share a preoccupation with the development, the recognition and change of consciousness (p. 68). He goes on in this chapter, again with resonances of Foucault to discuss the relationship of pedagogy, to *transitional capitalism* and the concomitant ‘possibility of new identity constructions’ (p. 76).

What was involved here was a shift from the student as producer and performer, to the ‘whole child’, a shift from measuring and representing the child, to knowing the child, from a form of pedagogy that is based on transmission to one that is focused on acquisition—tellingly in Bernstein’s terms from *visible* to *invisible*, from surface to depth. And there is a concomitant shift away from biological to cultural explanations of failure or difference, from fixity—based ‘upon the realization of competences that acquirers already possess or are thought to possess’ (1996, p. 58)—to possibility, articulated in part through psychological accounts of development and different stages and rates of development. That is, a shift to attuning pedagogy to the child (invisible) rather than the child to pedagogy (visible).

The constitution of the child as a developmental (developing) subject, positions the teacher in relation to the child as judge (what stage are they at?) and nurturer/pedagogue (how can I move them on?). At the same time this detaches classroom practice from its direct and subordinate relation to the selection and sequencing and assessment of knowledge. The examination is rendered redundant, assessment becomes a formative tool rather than a summative classification. At the same time this detachment opened up possibilities for new kinds of power relations and political practices. In real terms these latter possibilities were taken up, if at all, in very few schools and classrooms (RisingHill,¹⁸ William Tyndale,¹⁹ Holland Park²⁰) and the precarious concatenation of this social logic and new liberalism and liberation was to be swiftly and brutally disassembled.

To some extent at least, invisible pedagogy dissolves the formal division of space and time, and the authority of the teacher, that are fundamental to the disciplinary school, and thus ‘a pedagogic practice of this type is (at least initially) invisible to the acquirer, essentially because the acquirer appears to fill the pedagogic space rather than the transmitter’ (Bernstein 1990, p. 71). And crucially the celebration and ordering of organisational differences (age, ability, category) is replaced by a celebration of individual differences and *uniqueness* rather than comparison; ‘Invisible pedagogies are less concerned to produce explicit stratifying differences between acquirers because they are apparently less interested in matching the acquirer’s text against an external common standard’ (p. 71). In Foucault’s words ‘life has left the tabulated space of order and become wild once more’ (1970, p. 277). The norm recedes from view—acquisition rather than performance is emphasised and *sequencing rules* of acquisition are displaced. What Bernstein suggests is that what he calls the *grammar* or *ordering principles* of pedagogic practice are different in each case—that is ‘general principles underlying

¹⁸See <http://www.libed.org.uk/index.php/articles/348-risinghill-revisited>.

¹⁹‘This book chronicles the teachers’ (of WT) attempt to make their school a more open and humane institution, a place where the children could learn to take an active and responsible role in their own education, and where the teachers could decide in democratic ways on their methods of work’ (Back cover *William Tyndale The teachers’ story* (1976) Readers and writers Publishing Cooperative.

²⁰See <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2007/aug/25/guardianobituaries.obituaries>, on Holland Park’s first Headteacher Allen Clarke.

the transformation of knowledge into pedagogic communication ‘(Bernstein 1996, p. 39), where such communication is a ‘carrier, a relay for ... external power relations’ (p. 39).

Nonetheless, there are two stings in the Bernsteinian tail, which bring us back to Foucault, or a slightly different, later Foucault.²¹ First, Bernstein suggests the assumptions and competencies ‘available in the family and the child’ (1996, p. 84), required by invisible pedagogies ‘are less likely to be met in class or ethnically disadvantaged groups, and as a consequence ... the teacher is likely to misread the cultural and cognitive significance of the child’ (p. 84). A new form of differentiation and categorisation is evoked. Secondly, in the ‘multi-layering of communication’ required by invisible pedagogies there is a weakening of the division ‘between the inside of the child and the outside ... More of the child’s feelings, fantasies, fears and aspirations are expected to be made public. The surveillance of the child is total’ (p. 83). This is the ‘pathology’ of the invisible pedagogy. An intensification of power if you like, as the whole child is opened up to the *expert* pedagogic gaze of the teacher, a teacher who now does not differentiate the child on the basis of outward indicators of performance but understands the child in terms of their interior differences. It is within the subtle and conditional temporalities of development that childhood and the pupil are ‘made up’, and normalized, by what MacNaughton (2005, p. 30) calls ‘officially sanctioned developmental truths of the child’. Henriques et al. (2005, p. 195) make a similar argument about progressive pedagogy; ‘such a model’ they say ‘assumes a psychological subject laid bare to be re-formed in the new order’ (and) ‘such psychology and such practices are normalising in that they constitute a mode of observation and surveillance of production of children. Given this, it is difficult to conceive of these practices as being the basis of any kind of pedagogy which could potentially “liberate” children’ (p. 195). Allen also makes this point:

The history of the monitorial school must be placed alongside its rival, the moral training school, which inaugurated an educational tradition in which ‘free play’ and ‘democratic accountability’ entered the educational landscape. This tradition makes a virtue of pedagogies that pay attention to the natural environment and dispositions of the child. The child is located, very explicitly, at the centre of a moral scheme that is just as pernicious, if not more so, due to the skill by which it conceals its activities. To prioritize and listen to the child, to respond to the child, in the child’s own terms, embeds the child more firmly in a framework of power that has become so widespread that it is barely perceived.

(see <http://socialtheoryapplied.com/2013/04/17/foucault-disciplinary-power-and-the-dangerous-remainder/>, accessed 7.3.16).

Foucault also identifies an earlier iteration of progressivism and developmentalism.

We find the mould, the first model of the pedagogical colonisation of youth, in this practice of the individual’s exercise on himself, this attempt to transform the individual, this search

²¹Bernstein acknowledges the possibility of a relation of his analysis to Foucault in Chap. 3 (1996, p. 54) of PSCI.

for a progressive development of the individual up to the point of salvation, in this ascetic work of the individual on himself for his own salvation. On the basis of this, and in the collective form of this asceticism in the Brothers of the Common Life, we see the great schemas of pedagogy taking shape, that is to say, the idea that one can learn things only by passing through a number of obligatory and necessary stages, that these stages follow each other in time, and that in this ordered movement through time, each stage represents a degree of progress. The twinning of time and progress is typical of ascetic practice, and it will be equally typical of pedagogical practice. (Foucault 2006b, p. 67)

It is possible to see here then an intensification of power, embedded in the paradox discussed by Bernstein. While the modern school, as a form of panopticon, is premised upon and enacts a vertical and oppressive model of power, very evident in *Discipline and Punish*. The progressive school is premised on the sort of *transversal* (Foucault 2001, p. 239) and relational version of power outlined in *History of Sexuality Volume 1* (1981), which is more labile and mobile but no less effective in the constitution of subjectivity.²² As Lazaroiu (2013, p. 822) puts it: ‘Modern pedagogies are secular technologies of the self in which self-regulation and self-examination occupy centre ground’.

Embedded in the power/knowledge couplet, in education and elsewhere, is a paradox—a contradiction between knowing and being ‘known’, between competence and domination. Deacon notes that ‘What particularly intrigued Foucault, even though he did not develop this insight, was the problem of knowing how, in the typical pedagogical relationship, to avoid the effects of domination’ (2006, p. 184). In the enactment of judgement and the practices of evaluation and comparison, particular kinds of truth²³—the truths told about us—articulate our ‘discursive currency’ (Prado 2006, p. 80). That is, ways of thinking and talking about ourselves, to ourselves and to others—‘a regime of truth offers the terms that make self-recognition possible’ (Butler 2005, p. 22). This as Foucault puts it, is the face of truth which has been ‘turned away from us for so long and which is that of its violence’ (2013, p. 4).

Crucially, for my argument, within all of this ‘the teacher operates with a theory of reading’ (Bernstein 1996, p. 61) within which ‘the meaning of an acquirer’s signs is not available to the acquirer, only to the teacher’ (p. 61) and ‘this marks the professionalism of the teacher’ (p. 61). Here at last is recourse to esoteric knowledge. ‘Meaning is no longer read in an immediate perception, the figure no longer speaks for itself’ (Foucault 2001, p. 16). But contra Foucault it is not testing and ‘the examination [that] enabled the teacher, while transmitting his knowledge, to transform his pupils into a whole field of knowledge’ (Foucault 1979, p. 186) but rather the absence of the examination and indeed the test and the ‘freedom’ of the learner, which produces a space of observation, interpretation and perception for the teacher as pedagogue. It is within progressive pedagogies that the body of the

²²I will come back to this shift in Foucault’s conceptualization of power in Chap. 3.

²³Foucault does not offer a definition of truth; rather he provides a multi-faceted characterization (Prado 2006, p. 81).

learner is now ‘offered up to new forms of knowledge’ (1979, p. 155) within the classroom and ‘a whole analytical pedagogy was being formed’ (1979, p. 159).

Neoliberal Pedagogy

Paradoxically, the subsequent suppression or subjugation of progressive pedagogies, without any other claims to esoteric knowledge, leave the teacher exposed to and susceptible to a new and different kind of fabrication. What had vaguely and fragilely emerged in the period of the welfare state after the WW2 as the professional teacher, a teacher with an independent and scientific claim to judgement, is in the post-welfare period, a new historical conjuncture, a problem rather than a resource. The emphasis on care, on individuality, on ‘knowing’ the learner in their individuality, over and against taxonomy and typology, on understanding rather than managing behaviour, and the relation of that to the differentiation of learning experiences over and against the differentiation of students, and the avoidance of measurement—examinations or tests—is not well aligned to the needs of the neoliberal competition state and the evolving neoliberal economy. The classroom has been brought back into a direct and very visible relation to docility and productivity and security. The classroom door has been forced open once more to enable the tying of the school every more directly to the accumulation of capital (see Foucault 1979, p. 221). However, in this case it is a marketised, entrepreneurial school, formed in relation to the logic of competition, between students, teachers, schools and writ large between nations, through the techniques of international testing, and in relation to that, in the global economy.

So here there is a reversal or return of a kind, a re-emergence of a liberal politics, in neoliberal form, and in the classroom a renewed emphasis on managing behaviour and the fostering and celebrating performance over competence—but in relation to different labour market relations and economic and security relations. There is a return to enumeration and examination—via league tables, benchmarks, and targets. The development of new forms of measurement, articulated in relation to new ways of governing. This is what we might call *neoliberal pedagogy*, the ‘technocratic embedding of routines of neoliberal governance’ (Peck and Tickell 2002) in the everyday life of the school and the classroom.

This entails the dissolution of an esoteric basis for pedagogical knowledge, for teaching, and opens the classroom up to another transition, another kind of fracturing. A rupture in which the school is no longer set alongside and in resemblance to other institutions of the welfare state and the needs of the management of the population at least in the form that Foucault (1979) suggests—‘Is it surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?’ (1979, p. 228)—but rather is reconstituted in resemblance to ‘the firm’ and

the needs of the economy and efficiency and cost and the management of the workforce,²⁴ productivity rather than docility.²⁵

* “Everything gets measured and what gets measured gets managed” McKinsey in-house motto.

That is, ‘the extension of the economic form of the market ‘to the entire social body and to generalize it inside the whole social system that, normally, does not pass through or is not authorized by the market’ (Foucault 2010, p. 248). Here the separation of learning from adult life, and its simulation in schools, what Foucault somewhat confusingly calls the ‘pedagogization of learning’ becomes much less clear-cut.

When, with Rousseau and Pestalozzi, the eighteenth century concerned itself with constituting for the child, with educational rules that followed his development, a world that would be adapted to him, it made it possible to form around children an unreal, abstract, archaic environment that had no relation to the adult world. The whole development of contemporary education, with its irreproachable aim of preserving the child from adult conflicts, accentuates the distance that separates, for a man, his life as a child and his life as an adult. That is to say, by sparing the child conflicts, it exposes him to a major conflict, to the contradiction between his childhood and his real life. If one adds that, in its educational institutions, a culture does not project its reality directly, with all its conflicts and contradictions, but that it reflects it indirectly through the myths that excuse it, justify it, and idealize it in a chimerical coherence; if one adds that in its education a society dreams of its golden age [...] one understands that fixations and pathological regressions are possible only in a given culture, that they multiply to the extent that social forms do not permit the assimilation of the past into the present content of experience. (Foucault 1987, p. 81)

The ‘deeper’ esoteric knowledges of the child have been once again re-located from the classroom into the specialized functions of educational psychology, with its new forms of testing and new *taxinomia*—dyslexia, ADHD etc.—and neuroscience (Gillborn 2016) (see below).

As far as the teacher and the classroom is concerned the disciplines and discipline have become detached. The disciplines have their most direct relation to policy, and thence and indirect relation to practice.²⁶ At the same time, developmentalism has become re-embedded in the logic of neoliberalism, led by supra-national and international organisations emphasising the role of early childhood

²⁴Although it is exactly in these terms, at a previous historical conjuncture, that Foucault outlines the methods of *discipline* (1979, pp. 220–223).

²⁵Nonetheless, of course, what is happening is that prisons and hospitals are also made subject to these reforms, which re-establishes a new resemblance between them, and between them and school.

²⁶In October 2014, the Wellcome Trust and Education Endowment Foundation (EEF) announced the launch of six projects to investigate a variety of ways in which neuroscience might improve teaching and learning in the UK. Thousands of pupils across England will take part in a series of randomised controlled trials after the funding bodies identified a need for more robust evidence about how neuroscience relates to learning in order to support teachers and schools keen to use the science. The six projects have been awarded grants totalling almost £4 million. <http://www.cne.psychol.cam.ac.uk/news/educationneuroscience>.

development and education in securing economic growth, which in turn, has begun to influence the ways in which national governments engage with early childhood through education and social policy. Children are constructed as resources, valuable to the extent that they become productive citizens in the future as human capital.

The emphasis on human capital at an international level can be seen as evidence of hegemonic globalisation, whereby a series of universal truths have been created as to the benefits of early childhood education and care (ECEC). Human capital offers a powerful global rationale for national governments to invest in ECEC provision and offers evidence of where localism was once valued in caring for young children, now global economics plays a part. (Campbell-Barr and Nygard 2014, p. 348).

There are other traces of reversal and return in relation to contemporary pedagogy. First, we might note the reassertion of the early modern teacher as a moral subject, a child saving subject—which is most evident in those programmes like Teach First (Bailey 2015) and Teaching Leaders, which significantly also are organised on the basis of a return to pre-state forms of philanthropic education, a return to a rhetoric of meritocracy, and to forms of training that emphasise the character of the teacher and their practical classroom management skills.

Mission

To address educational disadvantage by growing a movement of outstanding middle leaders in schools in challenging contexts.

Vision

Teaching Leaders' vision is of a better society: one where life chances are not predetermined by social class, nor shackled by educational disadvantage. In the belief that children's success at school can be driven not by social background but by the quality and kind of education they receive, we want to strengthen the capacity of those who lead teaching and learning closest to the action on the front-line of schools in challenging contexts: middle leaders.

Values

The work of Teaching Leaders is focused around achieving our mission and driven by our core values:

- **Uncompromising.** We believe that in order to achieve our mission, we have to do whatever it takes; maintain the highest expectations and standards, retain a culture of no excuses, and believe in a growth mind-set through which every middle leader and child can achieve their potential
- **Personal.** We know that development and learning is different for every individual, so we listen to their needs, respond to feedback and adapt the way we deliver to provide personalised support to allow everyone to succeed
- **Collaborative.** We have a shared moral purpose and our movement works best when it works together, sharing content and ideas, jointly developing practice and collaborating to collectively achieve our mission
- **Innovative.** We know the challenges we face often require new approaches and creative solutions but we believe in innovating in a disciplined way, basing interventions and approaches on evidence
- **Optimistic.** We remain relentlessly optimistic that we can improve the life outcomes of every child, which will in turn motivate others and create an unstoppable movement for change.

This return to a *pedagogy of morality* and its clear undertones of pastoralism is mirrored in a renewed emphasis on the character and resilience of the student.

The definition of character in major research reports and Department for Education statements and support materials is broad. It includes 'therapeutic' approaches that are associated with the policy emphasis on well being as well as more 'traditional' approaches to character that specify virtues and character traits. It is a blended and **flexible** approach ... It is also interesting to note that in allowing this flexibility, there has been an increasing emphasis on 'performance virtues' such as grit and resilience.

This has not gone unnoticed by the Jubilee Centre- a major research Centre and provider of materials and receiver of funding- who express concern about an undue emphasis on 'Performance Virtues' rather than 'Moral Virtues' such as courage and honesty. (Jones 2016)

Furthermore, as noted above, in an odd relation to morality, there is also a return to the late modern preoccupation with biological explanations of differences in performance but in this case neuroscience and epigenetics.

The Department of Educational Neuroscience, Faculty of Psychology and Education of the [Vrije University of Amsterdam](#) will be hosting the 4th biennial meeting of the Special Interest Group (SIG) 22 "Neuroscience and Education" of the European Association for Research on Learning and Instruction (EARLY) (<http://www.sig22neuroeducation.com/2016-conference.html>)

Biosocial explanations of phenomenon are becoming prevalent in the public policy arena, specifically as 'biosocial justifications for governmental intervention' (Pykett and Disney 2015). This combination of academic study and policy-use produce an emerging set of implications relating to new developments in life sciences and raise questions concerning, for example, citizenship, subjectivity and policy-making and the desired introjections or 'implementations' of biosocial solutions to problems previously considered to be entirely social in nature ... (Gulson and Webb 2016).

Alongside testing and the examination, the possibilities of categorisation and the scourge of the norm, Allen (2014) illustrates the continuing role of eugenic rationality within contemporary education. He reminds us of the tortuous but fundamental intertwining of eugenics, testing and the *Origin of the Species*—the survival of the fittest, the need to adapt to changing environmental conditions—meritocracy in other words. Meritocracy, a term rediscovered and laughably misunderstood by Tony Blair, is now to the forefront of many of the third sector programmes that are embedded in English education policy—like Teach First, the Sutton Trust and ARK, whose *raison d'être* is to identify and sponsor the aspiring, able and deserving children of the working class. This works through what Allen (2014, p. 189) calls systems of *extraction*. This is a 'charitable' focus that Francis Galton, founder of intelligence testing, argued for in the 19th century (p. 99) based on a division between what he termed 'desirables', 'passables', and 'undesirables'.

Eugenics works by combining 'scientific testing' with systems of categories which then also define the limits of normality. There are now developments underway to extend the remit of testing from intelligence to character, DEMOS, the Blairian think tank, is one of several organisations jostling for the money attached to the current focus on character education championed by Nicky Morgan (England's Secretary of State for Education July 2014-July 2016) and others (<http://www.demos.co.uk/projects/the-character-inquiry>). Character is was already firmly embedded in UK Conservative Party welfare policy, with its fundamental

division between strivers and skivers²⁷—the latter who threaten a ‘deterioration in the noblest part of our nature’ (Darwin’s *The Descent of Man* 1871, p. 90). As Allen says ‘The success of eugenics would rely heavily on its popular appeal’ (2014, p. 107) and that continues to be the case as eugenic claims appear regularly in ministerial statements and tabloid headlines.

Within all of this there is a re-fabrication of the teacher as technician rather than as professional, through a proliferation of schemes, programmes and methods, which the teacher is expected to ‘follow’ and use (and ‘make their own’)—like, for example, Maths Mastery.

We have created an integrated professional development structure that flows seamlessly into every aspect of delivering outstanding mathematics teaching.

One-off training days rarely make a long-term difference. When you return to the classroom, the pressures of preparing lessons and delivering classes can mean the ideas from training can go out the window. That’s why we provide continued support, to ensure teachers have all of the training and resources required to teach every lesson over the course of the year.

This process begins with face-to-face workshops, where we impart the principles of Mathematics Mastery to partner teachers. This gives teachers the understanding, skills and frameworks to begin applying Mathematics Mastery in their classrooms. We then provide ongoing coaching and mentoring, as well as school visits, from experienced trainers to support teachers in their development. This is reinforced with access to exclusive online teaching and learning materials, including lesson guides for each week.

These guides give ideas and techniques for teachers to use in their lessons, integrating formal training with daily practice. They are not made to save time, but to allow teachers to spend more time creating and adapting lessons and using professional development training modules.

Mathematics Mastery also encourages teachers to use this framework to develop their own lessons and teaching techniques. Nothing delights us more than teachers absorbing the support and resources we provide and making them their own. (<http://mathematicsmastery.cheeselab.co.uk/our-vision/integrated-professional-development/>).

There is here also a new response to the current political and economic conjuncture, in relation to the changing form and modalities of the state, and changing boundaries between the economy and the state. That is, the re-positioning of education in many different respects as an opportunity for profit or social enterprise. The thorough re-working of the school as an enterprising institution, within which the ‘cost’ of the teacher is a problem to be solved, and the professionalism of the teacher, is a problem to be overcome.

A business model of schooling and its sensibilities and concomitant budgetary concerns lead to a focus on issues of cost, and foremost among school costs are teacher salaries; driving down wage costs can take the form of reducing the number of teachers, by introducing Edtech pedagogies, like *blended learning*; and/or deregulating teacher certification and employment, or by employing non-qualified

²⁷See <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/23/skivers-strivers-200-year-old-myth-wont-die>.

teachers and/or training ‘in house’ and a reliance on ‘what works’. These new forms of teacher employment often involve a shift to non-union labour and a preference for enterprising/innovative teacher subjects, untrammelled by welfare sensibilities; concomitantly systems and practices are introduced that ensure teacher labour and organizational decision-making are closely related to student performance indicators, which bring into play various forms of performance management, like, as mentioned previously, performance-related pay (and the dismissal of poorly performing teachers). This outcome data, usually generated and managed using measurement software systems, is used also as a form of self-promotion both in relation to student recruitment and institutional competition.

Clearly, again the move from progressive to neoliberal pedagogy is not a clean break; there is an overlaying of new upon old forms of power, a re-working of knowledges, practices and techniques within different conditions of possibility. The point of application of these techniques is, as Allen (2014, p. 224) carefully points out, now different, rather than the 19th century concern with altering the normal distribution of outcomes, ‘the rate of individual progression ... is the focus of improvement’, articulated through ‘value-added’ measurements. As he goes on to say the proliferation of base-line testing and student performance monitoring systems has also generated new business opportunities for universities and businesses eager to sell their systems to institutions insatiable for ‘process-based technologies’ (p. 231)—here neoliberal academia can seek both impact and profit. Testing and monitoring work at the nexus between aspiration, hope and failure—schools now predict futures, manipulate hope, and produce ‘likely futures’ (p. 233).

The intertwining of discipline with governmentality, a shift from docility to productivity, from discipline to enterprise, is not then an absolute shift but one of emphasis. A shift which reflects and responds to Foucault’s adumbration of another phase in the genealogy of the state—the emergence of the neoliberal state, and the concomitant rearticulation of the school as a site for the construction of neoliberal subjectivities—no longer is there a break between the world of education and the real world, rather the school, and education more generally are made subject to the extension of the economic form of the market. We can think of this in relation to the change of emphasis in Foucault’s concerns with truth, power and subjectivity, from the foregrounding of power in *Discipline and Punish* to the foregrounding of subjectivity in *The Birth of Biopolitics*. Perhaps also this is a shift from the first part to the second part of his oft quoted formulation of the subject ‘subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to’ (Foucault 1982, p. 212).

Neoliberalism is a rationality of government that relies in very particular ways on a ‘political anatomy of the body’. This is a new iteration of the population as a resource within which individuals, institutions and states must be ‘lean’, ‘fit’ and flexible, and indeed agile—active citizens in an active society. Here bodies are not ‘docile’ rather they are engaged in a form of insidious ‘disciplined self-management’ (Ozga 2009, p. 152) which involves making themselves healthy, ‘ready’, adaptable and agentic, in relation to the needs of fast capitalism, while at the same time, as

‘biological citizens’, taking responsibility for the damage that capital does. This is a ‘remoralisation’ of our relation to the state and to ourselves (Peters 2001, pp. 59–60). ‘It aspires to construct a responsible and moral individual ... whose moral quality is based on the fact that they rationally assess the costs and benefits of a certain act...’ (Lemke 2000, p. 12). The research on parental choice, for example, exemplifies this kind of responsible and assiduous individualism in contemporary education. This is the ontology of neo-liberalism: ‘... The only real agents, must be individuals, or let’s say, if you like enterprises’ (Foucault 2010 p. 173).

Having said that, education policy and practice, certainly in the contemporary period, are hybridized and incoherent. We systematically write the school as a one-dimensional site of power, as too modern, too neoliberal and neglect the intersection of forms of power. Nonetheless, we might seriously consider whether contemporary pedagogies, at least in part, are a form of neoliberal education, are part of a neoliberal *dispositif*, in which is constituted specific kinds of learner subjects who are adapted to risk, economic uncertainty and austerity.

Foucault as Anti-educator: Humanism and Education: Is Education Possible in Foucault?

I have sought to deconstruct the teacher, using Foucault to demonstrate the absence of a science of pedagogy in education or at least in the classroom. In relation to the constitution of the school as a site of power, of management and of economic efficiency, teachers are, essentially, ‘technicians of behaviour’, or ‘engineers of conduct’ (Foucault 1979 p. 294). Man—in this case as teacher and learner, says Foucault, in an aside which links together his archeological and genealogical analyses and their periodisations; ‘is, after all ... as he was thought and [and] defined by the nineteenth century’s so-called human sciences and as he was reflected in nineteenth-century humanism nothing more, ultimately, than a figure of population’ (Foucault 2009, p. 81). There is nothing very original in all of that. In chapter three I will explore the possibility of reconstructing the teacher as a very different kind of ethical subject.

So what does this tell us about Foucault and education or Foucault as educator. In the most obvious sense the recurring issue for Foucault is ‘whether an increase in our capabilities must necessarily be purchased at the price of our intensified subjection’ (Burchell 1996, p. 34) and thus the impossibility (and necessity) of education. The more we learn, the more we are made subject. Here education is straightforwardly a grid of power. As Green (1998, pp. 197–198) puts it, viewed from Foucault’s perspective education is nothing more than: ‘An imaginary field linking nostalgia and desire, including social anxieties around questions of change and generation, language and authority, structure and freedom, discipline and order’.

Here is one version of Foucault's anti-humanism, a denunciation both of foundationalism and of an Enlightenment-inspired, progressivist view of history, as the result of the actions of autonomous agents. One of the persistent and fundamental themes of his thought is his critique of the 'anthropologism' of modern thought, the tendency that is to equate knowledge as such with human knowledge, truth with human truth—the extraction of transcendental truth from an empirical being—in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* he described his project as one in which history would be 'untied from all anthropological constraints ... purified of any anthropologism' (1974, p. 25) and anthropocentric notions such as an essential subject. As Leask (2011, p. 58) puts it 'for Foucault, the post-Enlightenment world is characterized, not so much by the increased civilization and progress of its self-image but by an ever-widening (yet always anonymous) range of processes, techniques and technologies designed to ensure a regularized, efficient and docile social whole'—or as argued above active social whole. The school is one of many sites at which 'the doctrine of ontological individualism' (Olssen 2006, p. 177) is played out. Foucault rails against 'medical humanism' in *The Birth of the Clinic*, and we can perhaps imagine him, pouring derision, sarcasm and moral indignation in a similar way on both progressive educators and those bourgeois moralists who seek through education to make the working classes 'responsible'.

Leask (2011, p. 59) goes on to say 'Overall, Foucauldian analysis can now strip away the myths and self-deceit of educators, and expose the grim truth of the education process—namely, that it is a core element in the mechanics of modern disciplinarity' (p. 59). Foucault seeks to dispense with the Enlightenment faith in subject-centred reason. Education is not a site of reason but rather a site of discipline and discourse and differentiation, not simply reproduction, and certainly not liberation or discovery. Rather than seeing education and schooling (although we may want to separate these out) as means by which the individual is enabled to develop or unfold toward some absolute form of rational being, it is the conditions and contexts within which individuals are produced and made up that is important. 'The individual subject is a reality fabricated by ... discipline (Foucault 1979, p. 194). Therefore, 'it is not so much that "we go to school"; it is more that we only *emerge from school*' (Leask 2011 p. 60).²⁸ Man is 'already in himself the effect of a subjection' (Foucault 1979, p. 30). Surely there are enough asides in *Discipline and Punish* to indicate that education is one of those 'monsters' that Foucault's work addresses and condemns (or would have), this may seem 'over the top', extreme, but that is part of his style and method of working, part of his *limit attitude* and his irony toward the present. This is the kind of analysis that underlies Illich's (1976) argument for the need to 'de-school society'.²⁹

²⁸See Grant (1997).

²⁹Interestingly, in relation to pastoral power, Illich draws a parallel between the medieval priest and the promise of life after death and the modern teacher promising life after school.

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